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It is said that prior to the Third Punic War, whenever Cato the 
Elder addressed the Roman Senate he would finish his statement, no 
matter the subject matter, with the following exhortation:  “ceterum 
censeo Carthaginem esse delendam,” or “in my opinion, Carthage must be 
destroyed.”1  During Justice Stewart’s later years on the Supreme 
Court, his spirited Fourth Amendment dissents evinced comparable 
resolve in his quest to maintain the vitality of the warrant require-
ment.2  History has proven more charitable to Cato’s objective. 
The vigor of the warrant requirement has waned considerably 
since Justice Stewart’s departure from the Court.3  Meanwhile, the 
Court has found searches4 devoid of the other conventional Fourth 
Amendment protection, probable cause, to be increasingly accept-
able.  Unlike most areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence where 
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 1 PLUTARCH, Marcus Cato, in 2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 383 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Macmillan 
Co. 1914).  Other sources confirm Cato’s frequent references to Carthage although con-
siderable doubt remains as to the exact phrasing.  See Charles E. Little, The Authenticity 
and Form of Cato’s Saying “Cathago Delenda Est,” 29 CLASSICAL J. 429 (1934) (summarizing 
the various sources). 
 2 See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 609 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with the authorization of warrantless inspections of mines and stone quarries); Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 596 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with upholding a 
warrantless inspection of an automobile); see also William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, 
In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule:  Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s War-
rant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1075–83 (1994) (examining Justice Stewart’s vig-
orous dissents in defense of the Warrant Clause). 
 3 Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 2, at 1083–96 (describing the gradual weakening of the 
warrant requirement in the years after 1982 when Justice Stewart left the bench). 
 4 In an effort to avoid needless repetition, the term “search” will hereinafter be used to re-
fer to either a “search” or a “seizure” unless the distinction is somehow relevant in con-
text. 
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the Warrant Clause still operates, albeit subject to liberal exceptions, 
the Warrant Clause has almost never been applied to “suspicionless 
searches.”5  The time has come to reconsider this position. 
The current state of suspicionless search law embodies a bizarre 
paradox:  because one of the two conventional Fourth Amendment 
protections (probable cause) is already absent in suspicionless 
searches, the other conventional protection (the warrant require-
ment) must be inapplicable as well.  Common sense suggests that 
these are the searches for which the warrant requirement remains 
most important.  This Comment argues that, subject to existing ex-
ceptions, the Warrant Clause should presumptively apply to suspi-
cionless searches as it does in other areas of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, suspicionless search jurisprudence represents the 
Wild West of the Fourth Amendment:  chaotic, sparsely populated, 
and yet positioned for rapid expansion.  The Supreme Court’s ad hoc 
development of suspicionless search doctrine6 has predictably led to a 
disjointed area of law in search of practicable rules.7  The lack of clar-
ity, in turn, has highlighted the absence of any defined upper-limit to 
such expansions.8  The rise of exceptions to the individualized suspi-
 
 5 For background on the relationship between individualized suspicion and searches, as 
well as a strong critique of the move away from the requirement of individualized suspi-
cion, see Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonable-
ness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995). 
 6 The distinction between suspicionless searches and “special needs” searches merits a brief 
explanation at the outset.  “Special needs” searches technically represent a subset of sus-
picionless searches approved by the Supreme Court, although the distinction has become 
muddled at best.  See infra Part III.C.  The term “special needs” was coined by Justice 
Blackmun in his concurrence to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in judgment) (“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing interests 
for that of the Framers.”).  In this Comment, I reserve use of the term “special needs” to a 
meaning consistent with this definition.  For broader application to searches lacking indi-
vidualized suspicion, I use the term “suspicionless searches.” 
 7 This is a frequently leveled criticism of the “special needs” cases.  For an overview of the 
difficulties posed in reconciling and synthesizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
this area, see Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire:  The Supreme 
Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 419 (2007). 
 8 See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment:  An Exception 
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 563 (1997) 
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cion requirement has thus prompted concern that further en-
croachments upon privacy and liberty interests lie ahead.9 
The Supreme Court has found justifications for suspicionless 
searches under circumstances such as sobriety checkpoints,10 searches 
for contraband in schools,11 and mandatory drug testing policies.12  
These manufactured exceptions to conventional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine largely represent responses to perceived public perils, perils 
that might not have been adequately provided for under existing ju-
risprudence.13  Yet, these search procedures have been traditionally 
disfavored because they are so invasive of individual rights.  They 
should remain solutions of last resort.  This does not mean, however, 
that suspicionless searches are necessarily undesirable.  Rather, it 
suggests that they should be limited and, when justified, optimized to 
balance their benefits with the costs of their accompanying intru-
sions. 
Beyond the inherently invasive nature of suspicionless searches, 
significant problems exist within the current framework by which 
they are implemented.  This framework at once over-encourages the 
 
(expressing concern that the move towards a mere reasonableness standard in the “spe-
cial needs” cases might foreshadow a general move towards a reasonableness standard in 
evaluating all searches). 
 9 See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 5, at 634 (claiming that unless the Supreme Court returns to a 
requirement of individualized suspicion, the “number and intrusiveness of exemptions 
from the requirement of individualized suspicion will continue to grow”). 
 10 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (concluding that brief deten-
tions of drivers at sobriety checkpoints were consistent with the Fourth Amendment and 
the government’s interest in highway safety). 
 11 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (determining that a suspicionless search of a student by a school 
official was permissible under the Fourth Amendment). 
 12 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding a program of man-
datory drug testing for high school athletes under the auspices of a “special need”); Nat’l 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (permitting the drug testing 
of government employees engaged in narcotic interdiction without individualized suspi-
cion); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (determining that in-
dividualized suspicion was not required in order to mandate railway employees to submit 
to alcohol and drug testing in the wake of an accident). 
 13 A number of commentators have thus suggested that the political process is generally a 
sufficient safeguard in such cases.  See Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of 
General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 100–09 (2007) (proposing 
that political process protections should allow legislatures to enact suspicionless searches 
subject only to rational basis review); Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches:  Which 
Exception to the Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of 
Mass Transit Passengers to Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231, 3293–94 (2006) 
(arguing that the political process is sufficiently protective of individual rights in suspi-
cionless search cases as long as the search affects the privacy interests of the majority 
equally). 
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use of suspicionless searches by law enforcement, and, at the same 
time, potentially hampers the primary purposes of these searches.  
Government actors have incentives to use these procedures more of-
ten than is justified by the underlying need alone.  Meanwhile, the 
efficacy of suspicionless searches may be undermined by uncertainty 
as to the legality of the methods employed, promoting suboptimal 
methodology.14  Ultimately, however, the invasiveness of searches 
lacking individualized suspicion is likely their most troubling charac-
teristic. 
Despite the problems with the convoluted suspicionless search re-
gime currently in place, the relative infrequency of such cases has li-
mited the urgency of reform.  This situation appears to be ripe for 
change.  An allusion to a “special needs” case that has yet to reach the 
Supreme Court demonstrates the possibility that such exceptions will 
become increasingly important.15  A suspicionless search procedure 
designed to prevent a legitimate threat of a terrorist attack would al-
most certainly be upheld by courts under this doctrine.16  The nearly 
unlimited extent of the harm threatened by a terrorist attack encour-
ages the understanding that a “special needs” search would be both 
reasonable and desirable, even to one who believed that other excep-
tions to the individualized suspicion requirement were unwarranted.  
A suspicionless search regime is needed that will be flexible enough 
to encompass such contingencies, while still providing meaningful 
limits on governmental discretion. 
This Comment proposes a rethinking of a Fourth Amendment 
principle marked by an ever-shrinking purview:  the warrant re-
quirement.  There is no valid reason why the Warrant Clause should 
not be applied to suspicionless searches in the same way as it is to 
 
 14 See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding random suspi-
cionless subway searches in part because the policy protected privacy interests by allowing 
passengers the option of simply leaving the station rather than submitting to a search). 
 15 A number of other federal courts have, however, dealt with such situations and upheld 
such policies under the “special needs” doctrine, even though these cases present clear 
law enforcement interests.  See, e.g., id. at 275 (upholding New York City’s policy of ran-
dom suspicionless subway searches to prevent terrorism); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345, at 
*10 (D. Mass. 2004) (upholding random subway searches in Boston to protect the con-
vention center from a terrorist attack). 
 16 Justice O’Connor hypothesized about such an attack in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32 (2000).  She concluded that the “Fourth Amendment would almost certainly 
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack.”  
Id. at 44. 
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other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.17  However, a ques-
tion naturally follows:  how could a government agency, lacking sus-
picion of any one individual, obtain warrants ahead of time to search 
as of yet unidentified persons?  The answer lies in area warrants—
judicial warrants that specify the location and timing of a search 
without specifying the persons or objects to be searched.  This Com-
ment argues that within the suspicionless search context, area war-
rants are both constitutional and desirable. 
Regardless of seeking consistency in the Fourth Amendment, the 
ex ante application of the Warrant Clause to suspicionless searches 
offers substantial advantages.  The addition of the warrant require-
ment could optimize suspicionless searches in at least three ways.  
First, it could better restrict the use of suspicionless searches to those 
truly serving important government needs.  Second, it could promote 
concurrent oversight of these searches by the judiciary, and in the 
process it could potentially provide greater legitimacy to the searches.  
Third, by encouraging more selective use of the suspicionless search 
doctrine pursuant to additional oversight, the proposal seeks to pro-
vide counterbalances which should decrease ex post concerns.  This, 
in turn, may actually encourage courts to allow more invasive search 
procedures when necessary.  In sum, a drastic departure from con-
ventional Fourth Amendment protections merits experimentation 
with innovative counterbalances to compensate. 
Part II of this Comment outlines the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment, providing background for the discussion to follow.  Part III de-
scribes the current state of jurisprudence on suspicionless searches 
and seizures.  Part IV explains the primary problems embedded with-
in this jurisprudence.  This section also suggests why these problems 
will likely only be exacerbated over time.  Part V explains why uphold-
ing the warrant requirement for suspicionless searches is both consis-
tent with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and desirable in 
practice.  Part VI summarizes the discussion and concludes that the 
adoption of area warrants represents a potential solution worth at-
tempting. 
 
 17 This does not mean that the warrant requirement will always be practicable for suspi-
cionless searches.  As with other areas of search and seizure law, there will be situations 
when exigencies preclude the acquisition of a warrant prior to a suspicionless search.  
The Fourth Amendment already has various exceptions to account for such exigencies.  
There is no reason to suspect that these exceptions would be insufficient in the context of 
suspicionless searches, or that new exceptions could not be created. 
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II.  TEXTUAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The story of “sub-probable cause” searches begins with the text of 
the Fourth Amendment itself.  The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.18 
The text is generally interpreted as containing both a Reason-
ableness Clause and a Warrant Clause.  The interplay between the 
two clauses, accompanied by differing historical interpretations 
thereof, has engendered tremendous debate over the nature of the 
warrant requirement.19  Clearly, arguments as to the proper under-
standing of the warrant requirement in broader Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence are beyond the purview of this Comment.  More im-
portantly, though, they are not particularly relevant. 
Regardless of the strength of the so-called “warrant preference” 
today, or whether such a preference should even exist, warrants are 
still a prominent feature of Fourth Amendment doctrine.20  Although 
replete with exceptions, the warrant preference has stubbornly en-
dured.  The changes proposed in the following pages simply repre-
sent an effort to bring suspicionless searches back in line with main-
stream Fourth Amendment doctrine, from which they have 
inexplicably been separated.  In order to appreciate the current state 
 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19 See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985); 
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 (1991).  The 
most powerful advocate for a Fourth Amendment interpretation that subjugates the War-
rant Clause to the Reasonableness Clause has been Akhil Amar.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).  For arguments in-
terpreting a vigorous warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment, see Phyllis T. 
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:  Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. 
L. REV. 473 (1991); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 547 (1999); Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 2; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the 
Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 20 Whether a true “warrant requirement” exists within the Fourth Amendment is, perhaps, 
the central issue of controversy within the text of the Amendment.  Compare California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 566 (1991) (referencing “the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment”), with id. at 581–85 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disavowing any “requirement” 
for warrants in the Fourth Amendment, arguing that “it merely prohibits searches and 
seizures that are ‘unreasonable’”).  Despite the ongoing debate, this Comment still makes 
use of the term “warrant requirement” to remain consistent with the prior academic lit-
erature. 
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of law, however, we must consider how and why suspicionless search 
doctrine deviated from broader Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
the first place. 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIPLE NUANCED APPROACHES TO 
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The current state of suspicionless search and seizure jurispru-
dence presents a tolerated mess.  A comprehensive understanding of 
the doctrine has been undermined by the development of varied, and 
often incongruous, pockets of law.  In order to appreciate the diffi-
culties posed by current doctrine, as well as the likely impact of any 
remedy, we must first ask the question:  how did we ever get here? 
A.  Camara and the Waning of Probable Cause 
The first significant step towards a regime permitting suspicionless 
searches and seizures is generally considered to have occurred in Ca-
mara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco.21  The city ordinance at issue 
in Camara permitted housing inspectors acting in furtherance of their 
duties to enter any building (and residence therein) during reason-
able hours.22  The petitioner in Camara repeatedly refused entrance 
to a housing inspector and was subsequently prosecuted for his ac-
tions.23  At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the war-
rantless administrative searches provided for under the city ordi-
nance violated the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights and, if so, 
exactly how the rights were implicated.24  The Court determined that 
administrative searches such as those authorized under the ordinance 
“are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment” and that the safeguards of the warrant requirement 
cannot be circumvented merely due to the administrative nature of a 
search.25 
The ruling in Camara was noteworthy for a number of reasons.  
First, it held that Fourth Amendment protections are fully applicable 
to administrative inspections.  Second, and more importantly for the 
current inquiry, Camara redefined probable cause in terms of reason-
 
 21 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 22 Id. at 526 n.1. 
 23 Id. at 526. 
 24 Id. at 534. 
 25 Id. 
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ableness, injecting a balancing test into the analysis in the process.26  
In so doing, the Camara Court opened a breach in the conventional 
lines of the Fourth Amendment that would only expand in the years 
to follow. 
The redefinition of probable cause, however, belied another issue.  
In Camara, the Court exemplified a new willingness to radically re-
shuffle traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in favor of de-
sirable public policy outcomes.  To support the sudden vicissitude of 
probable cause, the Court suggested a distinction between searches 
that are primarily administrative in nature and those that are con-
ducted pursuant to a criminal investigation.27  However, even though 
the decision contrasted searches with a criminal purpose against ad-
ministrative searches, it failed to offer any concrete justification for 
distinguishing them.28  Within the confines of the new reasonableness 
test for probable cause it remained unclear how to evaluate the pur-
pose behind a search. 
In the forty years since Camara, the Court has repeatedly returned 
to the law enforcement distinction when it has scaled back Fourth 
Amendment protections.29  Amidst continual attempts to define the 
proper balance between public policy considerations and individual 
rights, the law enforcement distinction has become the touchstone of 
suspicionless search jurisprudence.30  Camara may have been the ge-
nesis of suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence, but the doc-
trinal change it embodied was decoupled from substantive guidance 
on how interests were to be balanced. 
B.  Camara’s Flotsam:  The Early Suspicionless Search Cases Conducted by 
Law Enforcement 
Suspicionless search exceptions developed in an ad hoc manner 
following Camara as different policy goals were identified urging 
searches that could not be supported under prevailing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Although searches devoid of individual-
ized suspicion had been upheld prior to Camara, these cases were es-
 
 26 See id. at 537–38. 
 27 See id. at 535, 538–39. 
 28 See Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 429 (examining unsettled matters after Camara). 
 29 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (distin-
guishing law enforcement officers from teachers due to the investigatory nature of their 
positions). 
 30 See infra Part III.D. 
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sentially limited to stops at border crossings.31  In the wake of Camara, 
however, distinct pockets of “sub-probable cause” law began develop-
ing. 
1.  Searches at the National Border 
Searches at the national border had been exempted from tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment protections even prior to Camara.32  The 
justification for the exemption, however, has shifted over time.  In 
Boyd v. United States,33 the Court upheld warrantless customs inspec-
tions of goods entering the country.34  The Court noted that the same 
Congress which had adopted the Fourth Amendment also adopted 
the first customs statute, the Collection Act of 1789, which disavowed 
the warrant requirement for customs searches.35  The language of the 
statute, however, seemed to affirm the requirements of individualized 
suspicion for even these searches.36  The language of the statute also 
indicated that beyond the practical difficulties of requiring warrants 
for customs searches, the primary justification for disavowing the re-
quirement was to ensure the collection of due revenue.37  Nearly one 
hundred years later, to the extent that it examined the question of 
 
 31 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 32 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–19 (1977) (offering an overview of the re-
levant history and precedents); see also Keeley, supra note 13, at 3242–43 (providing de-
tailed factual background). 
 33 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 34 Id. at 638. 
 35 Id. at 622–24. 
 36 Section 24 of the Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed 1790), reads as 
follows: 
And be it further enacted, That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other 
person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full pow-
er and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to 
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and 
therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise; and 
if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any particular dwell-
ing-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon appli-
cation on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant 
to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to 
search for such goods . . . . 
  See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 671 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to the Collection Act of 1789 to illustrate the First Congress’s desire to 
maintain individualized suspicion as a requirement even where the warrant requirement 
would be inapplicable); Keeley, supra note 13, at 3242 n.79 (explaining that “it is not en-
tirely clear that the Collection Act discussed in Boyd contemplated suspicionless 
searches”). 
 37 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed 1790). 
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border searches, the Boyd Court similarly focused on the revenue-
gathering purposes of customs searches.38 
In 1925, the Court supplemented the understanding of border 
searches with dictum from Carroll v. United States,39 suggesting why au-
tomobile passengers entering the country could not avail themselves 
of conventional Fourth Amendment protections.40  Perhaps demon-
strating a broadening concern over both contraband, in this case al-
cohol, and illegal entrances by individuals at the national borders, 
the Court concluded that:  “Travellers may be stopped in crossing an 
international boundary because of national self protection reasonably 
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to 
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought 
in.”41  The Court affirmed this position in United States v. Ramsey,42 
finding that probable cause was not required for a customs agent to 
open mail suspected of containing drugs.43 
Yet, it was not until 1985, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,44 
that the Court explicitly authorized routine searches absent any indi-
vidualized suspicion at the borders.45  Although the Court referenced 
Ramsey and Carroll to support the proposition that the permissibility 
of routine suspicionless searches at the border was well established, 
neither of these decisions went that far.46  Indeed, the Ramsey Court 
was careful not to discuss any requirement of suspicion as it eschewed 
the requirement of probable cause.47  The Montoya Court, meanwhile, 
seems to have garnered support from a distinct group of post-Camara 
cases involving suspicionless stops at roadway checkpoints.48  Whether 
 
 38 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.  According to the Court: 
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties 
and concealed to avoid payment [sic] thereof, are totally different things from a 
search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of ob-
taining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against 
him. . . .  In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the 
property; in the other it is not. 
  Id.  Interestingly, the distinction the Court drew between impermissibly held goods and 
private papers hints at later tests focusing on the criminal purposes of a search. 
 39 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 40 Id. at 154. 
 41 Id. 
 42 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
 43 Id. at 624–25. 
 44 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
 45 Id. at 538. 
 46 See id. at 538 n.1. 
 47 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620–25. 
 48 In particular, the Court referenced United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63 
(1976), in support of the permissibility of routine suspicionless searches at the border. 
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or not routine suspicionless searches were being conducted at the 
borders prior to this time, Montoya finally settled the permissibility of 
such searches.  While the Court noted the unique sovereignty inter-
ests implicated by border crossings to support its conclusion,49 Camara 
and its recent progeny provided the framework and context that 
made the decision appear to be so obviously correct.50 
Border searches serve as an apt entry point for a discussion on 
suspicionless searches.  Although the warrant requirement and the 
(full) probable cause requirement had never been applied to such 
searches, the gradual codification of an exception to individualized 
suspicion illustrates a Court reacting to newly perceived threats at the 
borders.  Cross-border vehicular rum-running during prohibition, il-
legal immigration, and the rise of international narcotics trafficking 
are examples of difficult-to-curtail twentieth century threats for which 
the national borders are the logical enforcement point.  Although 
national security concerns have clearly paralleled other border con-
trol concerns during the twentieth century, the specter of terrorism 
in the twenty-first century presents a novel concern that may force 
changes in suspicionless search jurisprudence within the national 
borders.51  Just as revealing, the early post-Camara border search cases 
first demonstrated the difficulties inherent in maintaining separate 
and viable pockets of law for suspicionless searches. 
2.  Checkpoint Stops 
More than any other category of suspicionless searches, roadway 
checkpoint cases have illustrated the difficulty of shaping workable 
rules for application to an entire category of suspicionless searches, 
let alone to suspicionless searches more broadly.  Within the broader 
penumbra of roadway checkpoints, a number of distinct sub-
categories have been litigated.  Checkpoints targeting illegal immi-
grants,52 intoxicated drivers,53 and unlicensed drivers54 have all been 
upheld as searches exempt from the traditional requirement of indi-
 
Montoya, 473 U.S. at 538.  Martinez-Fuerte upheld a series of suspicionless checkpoint stops 
on highways just beyond the Unites States-Mexico border which sought to apprehend il-
legal immigrants.  428 U.S. at 562–63. 
 49 Montoya, 473 U.S. at 537–38. 
 50 See id. at 537. 
 51 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 52 See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543. 
 53 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 54 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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vidualized suspicion.  Such cases foreshadowed the inherent tension 
that would develop with the primary purpose test expounded in City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond.55   
Roadway checkpoints, specifically those targeting illegal immi-
grants, were among the first suspicionless search cases to reach the 
Court in the wake of Camara.56  The Court has generally upheld the 
use of such checkpoints, despite their obvious law enforcement pur-
pose, as long as certain safeguards exist.57  The limits of these check-
points were explored in a series of cases during the 1970s.  In the ear-
liest checkpoint cases, the Court distinguished roadway checkpoints 
from roving vehicle patrols near the border, which require reason-
able suspicion based on articulable facts for a stop.58  The key distinc-
tion between checkpoints and roving stops is the availability of 
checkpoint procedures to limit the otherwise unlimited discretion of 
law enforcement officers in selecting individuals for stops.59  Even 
checkpoint searches are impermissible if established procedures fail 
to meaningfully limit officers’ discretion in selecting vehicles for a 
search.60  However, the Court has proven less concerned about the 
discretion to merely stop individual vehicles in the context of a 
checkpoint.  In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,61 the Court found that a 
brief detention for questioning at immigration checkpoints required 
no quantum of individualized suspicion.62  This holding paved the 
way for checkpoint stops targeting additional classes of individuals. 
A few years after Martinez-Fuerte, the Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of discretionary “spot checks” on roadways targeting unli-
censed drivers and unregistered vehicles in Delaware v. Prouse.63  Prouse 
applied the holdings of the immigration checkpoint cases in this ad-
 
 55 See infra Part III.D. 
 56 See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
 57 See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 n.12 (referring to the “particular law enforcement 
needs served by checkpoints”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–38 (2000) 
(acknowledging the law enforcement purpose at work in Martinez-Fuerte, but distinguish-
ing it as not aimed at preventing “ordinary criminal wrongdoing”). 
 58 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (finding that only reasonable suspicion is required for a 
roving immigration patrol to stop a vehicle near the border); Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 
273 (holding that roving immigration searches near the border must still be predicated 
on probable cause). 
 59 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882. 
 60 See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (invalidating an immigration checkpoint in 
which officers retained full discretion to select vehicles for stops). 
 61 428 U.S. 543. 
 62 Id. at 556–64. 
 63 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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ditional context, essentially creating a new checkpoint exception to 
the Fourth Amendment in the process.  As with the roving patrols in 
Almeida-Sanchez, the “spot checks” were held to be unreasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment as they failed to place any limits on offi-
cer discretion.64  Nonetheless, the Court explained that it was not for-
estalling less invasive methods or techniques that did not involve “the 
unconstrained exercise of discretion.”65  In particular, it explained 
that “[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is 
one possible alternative.”66 
The decision also shed light on how governmental interests 
should be balanced against privacy interests.  The decision suggested 
that the safety benefits of the license and registration “spot checks” 
were sufficiently important to support checkpoint stops in the ab-
sence of individualized suspicion.  That this justification could not 
support discretionary “spot checks” may not have been surprising;67 
however, the reasoning offered by the Court was.  The Court ana-
lyzed whether, in furtherance of the state’s goal, the “spot check” was 
a “sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon 
Fourth Amendment interests.”68  While the unbridled discretion of 
enforcing officers was still determinative, that consideration was more 
explicitly placed within the confines of a balancing test. 
The immigration checkpoint cases did not affect the requirement 
of probable cause prior to a full-blown vehicle search, even for those 
conducted in conjunction with a checkpoint stop.  However, Prouse 
quietly expanded the permissible scope of brief seizures at check-
point stops to include affirmative demands that drivers produce cer-
tain documentation.69  A decade later, the balancing test at the heart 
of the decision was readdressed in the context of sobriety check-
points.70  The checkpoints at issue in Michigan Department of State Police 
 
 64 Id. at 663. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896–97 (finding that discretionary checkpoints do not sufficiently 
protect individuals from arbitrary invasions of privacy). 
 68 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. 
 69 Id. at 663. 
 70 In the wake of Prouse, the balancing test for seizures less intrusive than full arrests was re-
examined in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), a case involving the seizure of a pedes-
trian on less than reasonable suspicion.  The holding applied the reasoning of Prouse and 
the immigration checkpoint cases to seizures more broadly, finding that in balancing the 
public interest against the intrusion to individual liberty a central concern is limiting “un-
fettered discretion of officers in the field.”  Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.  Thus, later suspi-
cionless search and seizure cases, including checkpoint cases, often refer to the balancing 
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v. Sitz71 were part of a pilot program which authorized sobriety check-
points.  Seeking to promote highway safety, the program imple-
mented checkpoints requiring all passing drivers to stop and be 
“briefly examined for signs of intoxication.”72  Acknowledging the 
powerful state interest at work, the Court next evaluated the intru-
siveness of the checkpoints in question.  It found the objective intru-
sion of the brief questioning to be minimal, as it had with the immi-
gration checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.73 
The Court also elaborated on language from Martinez-Fuerte to ex-
plain the relevance of “subjective intrusion” in the balancing, holding 
that only “the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists” 
need be considered.74  Sitz further repudiated the need for a “search-
ing examination of ‘effectiveness’” as an element of the balancing 
test, holding that it is enough that law enforcement choose amongst 
“reasonable alternatives” in selecting a suspicionless search tech-
nique.75  The decision thus elaborated on the application of the bal-
ancing test for checkpoint cases, while still failing to provide any 
meaningful limitation on the use of checkpoints. 
C.  The Development of the “Special Needs” Doctrine 
On March 7, 1980, a high school teacher in Middlesex County, 
New Jersey brought two girls to the principal’s office for smoking in a 
school restroom.  After one of the girls denied the allegation, the as-
sistant vice principal searched her purse, finding marijuana and other 
evidence of drug dealing in the process.  Nearly five years later, Jus-
tice White, writing for a majority of the Court, upheld the search of 
the student’s purse in New Jersey v. T.L.O.76  Amidst considerable con-
 
test from Brown rather than from Prouse or the immigration checkpoint cases.  See, e.g., 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990). 
 71 496 U.S. 444. 
 72 Id. at 447. 
 73 Id. at 451–52. 
 74 Id. at 452. 
 75 Id. at 453–54.  The Michigan Supreme Court had read the Court’s decision in Brown, 443 
U.S. 47,  to require an “effectiveness” prong in the balancing test, gauging the ability of 
the seizure procedure to promote the state’s interest.  Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 429 
N.W.2d 180, 183–85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the ba-
lancing test should contain such an inquiry, but found that deference to law enforcement 
was appropriate on this question as long as the procedure chosen was a reasonable alter-
native to other techniques.  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453–54 
(1990). 
 76 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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fusion, the decision paved the way for a new suspicionless search 
analysis, commonly referred to as the “special needs” analysis. 
The term “special needs” was actually coined by Justice Blackmun 
in his concurring opinion.77  He explained, “[o]nly in those excep-
tional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause require-
ment impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of 
interests for that of the Framers.”78  The majority opinion had no 
such “special need” requirement.  Rather, the majority found that “a 
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, un-
der all the circumstances, of the search.”79  In essence, the majority 
found that, given the unique demands and constraints of a school 
environment, the relaxation of Fourth Amendment protections was 
reasonable.80 
Nonetheless, it was Justice Blackmun’s opinion, and in particular 
his terminology, that resonated beyond the facts of T.L.O.  A majority 
of the Court soon adopted his “special needs” language, although not 
his accompanying interpretation of the language.81  Yet, rather than 
providing an encompassing framework to evaluate all searches and 
seizures devoid of probable cause or a warrant, the “special needs” 
doctrine came to define a distinct category of searches and seizures 
conducted by non-law enforcement officials. 
A plurality of the Court initially adopted the “special needs” lan-
guage in O’Connor v. Ortega82 to uphold a public employer’s search of 
an employee’s office in the absence of probable cause or a warrant.  
The plurality recognized a “special need” to allow public employers 
to intrude upon employees’ privacy interests in the furtherance of 
work-related matters and investigations of misconduct.83  Instead of 
considering whether this need exceeded the “normal need for law en-
 
 77 See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 341 (majority opinion). 
 80 Note that unlike in most of the “special needs” cases to follow, individualized suspicion 
was present in T.L.O.  Based on the attending teacher’s report that the girls had been 
smoking in the restroom, the assistant principle had reasonable suspicion that cigarettes 
would be found in the purse.  Id. at 345–46. 
 81 See Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 449–50 (explaining that Justice Blackmun understood the 
“special needs” threshold to apply to all suspicionless search and seizure situations, in-
cluding those serving a law enforcement need, in contrast to the ensuing application of 
the concept by the Court). 
 82 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 83 Id. at 725. 
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forcement,”84 the plurality compared the ability of public employers 
and law enforcement officers to meet the demands of probable 
cause.85  So began the creation of a niche for “special needs” cases, to 
be distinguished from those searches conducted by law enforcement 
officials. 
The boundaries of the “special needs” analysis were further tested 
in Griffin v. Wisconsin.86  In Griffin, the majority recognized a “special 
need” for the supervision of parolees within Wisconsin’s probation 
system.  This need, in turn, justified the search of a probationer’s res-
idence in the absence of probable cause or a warrant, pursuant to sta-
tute.87 
Even though he recognized that the supervision of probationers 
represented a “special need,” Justice Blackmun vehemently dissented 
in Griffin.  He concluded that the presence of a “special need” merely 
justified “an application of the Court’s balancing test and an exami-
nation of the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause require-
ments.”88  In Justice Blackmun’s view, the probationer’s status as a re-
cent criminal offender only justified lessening the probable cause 
standard to that of reasonable suspicion.  Citing the traditionally 
heightened protections afforded private dwellings, he also refused to 
accept the necessity of discarding the warrant requirement for the 
search of a probationer’s house.89  His interpretation, however, was 
not to prevail. 
The public officials in T.L.O., O’Connor, and Griffin had all pos-
sessed individualized suspicion of wrongdoing before engaging in a 
search.  Any supposition that this would become an inexorable re-
quirement within the “special needs” analysis was soon dispelled in 
two cases decided the same day in 1989, Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives’ Association90 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab.91  In Skinner, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, applied 
the “special needs” rationale to a federal regulation mandating suspi-
cionless drug testing of railroad employees after train accidents.  Ref-
erencing Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Kennedy explained that “a showing 
 
 84 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 85 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724. 
 86 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
 87 Id. at 875–80. 
 88 Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 89 Id. at 883–84. 
 90 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 91 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a 
search must be presumed unreasonable.”92 
The holding in Martinez-Fuerte, however, was limited to brief stops 
and accompanying questioning.  The limited invasiveness of the sei-
zures was a crucial consideration.93  In general, the checkpoint cases 
relied on the distinction between searches and seizures as a primary 
limitation on law enforcement activity.  Skinner, in contrast, author-
ized suspicionless searches of a person’s body.94  Outside of the high-
way checkpoint context, the Court was finding that a search/seizure 
distinction was incompatible with the policy tradeoffs it sought to up-
hold.  The distinction simply could not be rationalized with the more 
invasive techniques that the Court thought were necessary to combat 
evils such as school violence. 
This point was soon reemphasized in the context of drug screen-
ing.  Von Raab involved a challenge to the Customs Service’s proposed 
drug-screening program for employees holding certain sensitive posi-
tions, such as those tasked with drug interdiction.95  Justice Kennedy, 
again writing for the majority, determined that the deterrence of 
drug-use within sensitive governmental positions represented a “spe-
cial need” at least as important as the promotion of railway safety in 
Skinner.96  Again, the majority found that the absence of individual-
ized suspicion, let alone probable cause or a warrant, did not make 
the searches presumptively unreasonable.97  Unlike in Skinner, the 
preemptive nature of the drug-testing in Von Raab may have made the 
searches more difficult to disentangle from a “normal need” of law 
enforcement.98  However, the federal program seemed to account for 
this.  As Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]est results may not be used in 
a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s con-
sent.”99 
A final point of interest in Von Raab was how the border search 
cases supported the recognition of a “special need.”100  Even though 
 
 92 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 625–33. 
 95 489 U.S. at 665–66. 
 96 Id. at 666. 
 97 Id. at 668. 
 98 Id. at 660. 
 99 Id. at 666. 
100 See id. at 668–70 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), United States v. Mon-
toya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), and United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), to 
support the position that the “national interest in self-protection could be irreparably 
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the search in Von Raab ultimately shared a commonality of purpose 
with these cases (promoting the integrity of border control opera-
tions), the appropriate analysis remained distinct.  Indeed, the bor-
der search rationale, even if it were applicable in Von Raab, would 
have been insufficient to uphold the Court’s finding.  While the 
Court in Montoya de Hernandez considered routine searches at the 
border to be obviously permissible in the absence of probable cause, 
it found that reasonable suspicions was still a prerequisite to a seizure 
of an individual at the border.101  It is highly unlikely that the Montoya 
de Hernandez Court would have considered the collection of urine for 
drug-testing to be a “routine border search”102 within the meaning of 
its decision.  This presents another example of the growing divide be-
tween “special needs” cases and other sub-probable cause cases.  As 
with the search in Griffin of the probationer’s home, a location usu-
ally entitled to heightened Fourth Amendment protection, the em-
ployer searches in Skinner and Von Raab did not seem as troubling to 
the Court as those conducted by law enforcement officers in other 
areas. 
The Court has more recently applied the “special needs” analysis 
to random drug-testing of public school students.  A decade after 
T.L.O, the Court returned to a school environment in Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton.103  Writing for six Justices, Justice Scalia found that 
the randomized drug testing of students voluntarily participating in 
extracurricular athletics was permissible under the reduced burdens 
of the analysis.104  Referencing T.L.O.’s previous application of the 
“special needs” doctrine to public schools, Justice Scalia omitted a 
discussion on the practicality of applying the warrant or probable 
cause requirements.105  Under Justice Scalia’s analysis, the “special 
needs” requirement apparently only asked whether it would be prac-
tical to apply the warrant and probable cause requirements to a 
search under the circumstances.106  After deciding that it would be, 
the balancing of interests presented a separate issue.  Surprisingly, 
this approach essentially divorced the importance of the purpose be-
 
damaged if those charged with safeguarding it were, because of their own drug use, un-
sympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics”). 
101 473 U.S. at 541. 
102 Id. at 540. 
103 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
104 Id. at 664–65. 
105 Id. at 653. 
106 Id. at 655–56. 
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hind the search from the determination that a “special need” was 
present. 
The decision in Acton also signaled an expansion of the “special 
needs” doctrine.  Unlike in T.L.O., no individualized suspicion was 
required in Acton.107 Skinner and Von Raab had previously upheld 
searches devoid of individualized suspicion, but the decision in Acton 
went farther, as Professor Wayne LaFave has explained.108  Professor 
LaFave has recognized three key departures from prior “special 
needs” cases.109  First, the nature of the intrusion is more severe in sit-
uations where supervised provision of a urinalysis sample is re-
quired.110  Second, the drug-testing of student athletes was not re-
sponding to a risk of the same magnitude as any of the prior “special 
needs” cases (or, arguably, any other category of cases authorizing 
searches in the absence of probable cause).111  Referencing virtually 
all of these categories, Professor LaFave explained, “[a]lthough a 
drug-free educational environment is a significant governmental in-
terest, it is quite obviously not of the same order as those just men-
tioned.”112 
Another crucial distinction in Acton was the absence of a valid ex-
planation as to why a requirement of individualized suspicion would 
be either infeasible or impractical prior to drug testing student ath-
letes.113  As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent, the school envi-
ronment, entailing close supervision of students, is actually rather 
well-suited to a requirement of individualized suspicion.114  Ulti-
mately, by discarding an analysis considering the feasibility of height-
ened Fourth Amendment protections, the opinion may have signaled 
the most radical departure from prior cases.  The middle ground be-
 
107 Id. at 661. 
108 See Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment:  Confessions of a Patron 
Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2577–79 (1996). 
109 Id. at 2577. 
110 Id.  As Professor LaFave points out, the Court in Skinner emphasized the greater concern 
over the invasiveness of urinalysis tests and the procedures for procuring the samples.  Id. 
at 2577–78.  However, both Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989), and Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
679 (1989), ultimately upheld these tests despite the heightened intrusiveness.  As such, 
while this distinction may represent a departure from the earlier “special needs” cases, 
the nature of the intrusion was not the great departure in Acton.  Instead, the great depar-
ture was this heightened intrusion combined with the weaker justification for the search 
procedure. 
111 LaFave, supra note 108, at 2577. 
112 Id. at 2578. 
113 Id. at 2578–79. 
114 Vernonia Sch. District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 679 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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tween probable cause-based searches and suspicionless searches had 
apparently disappeared. 
D.  Edmond and Ferguson:  Substantive Checks on the Expansion of 
Suspicionless Searches or Mere Speed Bumps? 
T.L.O. and its progeny left a serious question about how the ex-
pansion of suspicionless search doctrine could be reasonably con-
tained.  If the Court was having difficulty providing an integrated un-
derstanding that encompassed all of the various sub-probable cause 
categories, it seemed unlikely that it could create a workable doc-
trinal boundary to distinguish these cases from the greater mass of 
search and seizure law.  Still, in the past decade the Court has, with 
limited success, made a number of attempts to do just that.115 
An initial indication of the Court’s concern with expanding suspi-
cionless searches appeared in Chandler v. Miller.116  In Chandler, eight 
Justices determined that Georgia’s drug testing requirement for cer-
tain elected officials did not fit within a permissible suspicionless 
search category.117  While the majority’s language seemed to limit the 
purview of suspicionless searches, the facts of Chandler left doubt as to 
its greater applicability.118 
The first meaningful attempt to limit the permissible purposes for 
suspicionless searches occurred in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.119  In 
the summer of 1998, the City of Indianapolis instituted a series of 
roadway checkpoints with the expressed goal of interdicting narcot-
ics.120  Similar to previously upheld checkpoints, applicable check-
point guidelines limited officer discretion in the selection of vehi-
cles.121  Once a vehicle was stopped, a canine trained in the detection 
of narcotics would circle the vehicle and signal if narcotics were de-
tected.122  No further search would be conducted in the absence of 
 
115 See Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”:  Suspicionless Searches, “Special 
Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 521 (2004) (finding that although the 
Court has recently embraced the role as a more discerning “policy magistrate” in suspi-
cionless search and seizure cases, it is uncertain whether it will retain this role). 
116 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
117 Id. at 309. 
118 See Sundby, supra note 115, at 517–18 (noting that Chandler was a relatively easy case for 
the Court to decide and its impact was questionable in light of the “special needs” cases). 
119 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
120 Id. at 34–35. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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suspicion.123  Nonetheless, a majority of the Court determined that a 
crucial line had been crossed. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that the check-
point violated an implicit understanding from the accumulated case 
law:  that a “general interest in crime control” was not a sufficient jus-
tification for a departure from individualized suspicion.124  In devel-
oping a new distinction to separate Edmond from all prior suspi-
cionless jurisprudence, Justice O’Connor focused her analysis on the 
“primary purpose” of the checkpoint.125  She concluded, “[w]e de-
cline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion 
where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordi-
nary enterprise of investigating crimes.”126 
Absent from the decision was a clear explanation of how courts 
should determine a search procedure’s primary purpose.  Narcotics 
interdiction was easily categorized as its purpose implicated a general 
interest in crime control, presenting an easy case in which to establish 
the new rule.  Clearly, previously upheld suspicionless searches had, 
at least facially, been conducted for law enforcement purposes.127  By 
explicitly reiterating the holdings of these past decisions, Edmond 
emphasized the lack of a viable distinction.128  Even if the decision 
had provided clear guidance on which purposes were permissible, it 
still failed to explain how to adequately distinguish a primary purpose 
from an ancillary one.  As Indianapolis had explicitly stated the nar-
cotics-interdiction purpose of its checkpoints, there was little ques-
tion as to its primary purpose.129  However, a simple counterfactual 
indicates the difficulty of making such determinations.  If Indianapo-
lis had not stated the purpose of these checkpoints, or if it had 
masked the checkpoints as attempts to regulate other lawful purposes 
(such as verifying driver licenses), the judicial determination of the 
checkpoint’s primary purpose might well have come out differently. 
The most recent applications of the primary purpose test have 
heightened the stubborn mystery that encompasses suspicionless 
searches and the Fourth Amendment.  In Ferguson v. City of Charles-
 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 41 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). 
125 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40. 
126 Id. at 44. 
127 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (acknowledging that the goals in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, secur-
ing the border and arresting drunk drivers, respectively, are law enforcement activities 
implicating criminal proceedings). 
128 See id. at 48. 
129 See id. at 35. 
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ton,130 the Court invalidated a public hospital’s policy of reporting to 
police the prenatal use of cocaine, determined by drug-screens, by 
expectant mothers.131  The Court held that the situation was distin-
guishable from prior “special needs” cases due to the immediate law 
enforcement objectives of the program and the use of the drug-
screens in criminal prosecutions.132  In so doing, the majority found 
that the ultimate purpose of the hospital policy was not controlling.  
The majority admitted that the hospital’s ultimate purpose may have 
been to encourage the women in question to seek treatment.133  In 
this case, however, the immediate purpose of the program was held 
to be indistinguishable from its “primary purpose.”134  As the immedi-
ate purpose of the program was to collect evidence for a criminal 
prosecution, the majority found that the program violated the Ed-
mond test.135  Any distinction between the impermissible purpose in 
Ferguson and the permissible purposes in prior highway checkpoint 
cases is dubious at best.136 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAILED ATTEMPTS TO RATIONALIZE 
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE DOCTRINE 
The prevailing suspicionless search regime is at once too broad 
and too restrictive.  It is too broad in that it fails to demarcate clear 
boundaries between permissible and impermissible searches based on 
the purposes of the searches.  It is too restrictive in that it limits the 
techniques available to law enforcement in the furtherance of per-
missible goals.  Such limitations have proven manageable (if not co-
herent) under the narrow circumstances in which the Court has ex-
amined law enforcement searches.  New demands for suspicionless 
searches, however, are demonstrating the difficulties of applying cur-
rent case law to a broader spectrum of cases.  Considering the past 
forty years of suspicionless search jurisprudence, anyone anticipating 
a doctrinal solution to such challenges should not hold his breath. 
 
130 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
131 Id. at 86. 
132 Id. at 79–85. 
133 Id. at 82–84. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 84. 
136 See, e.g., Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 479–80 (examining the similarity between the imme-
diate law enforcement purpose of the hospital in Ferguson and the immediate law en-
forcement purposes at work in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte). 
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A.  A Problem of Purpose 
The range of permissible purposes for suspicionless searches is 
not meaningfully restricted by the current state of the law.  The con-
fusion suggests at least two undesirable consequences.  First, and 
most obviously, searches that actually represent an undesirable trade-
off between public policy and an invasion of individual liberties are 
likely to be permitted under the current regime.  Second, the confu-
sion may actually discourage other searches that actually reflect a de-
sirable tradeoff. 
By grafting the primary purpose test onto the existing balancing 
test, the Court apparently sought to limit the permissible rationales 
for suspicionless searches.  While the primary purpose test, on its 
face, proscribes a vast range of overt law enforcement conduct, its 
clarity is limited to those law enforcement techniques supported by 
an evident primary purpose.  The ability of the test to restrict unde-
sirable search techniques with multiple or uncertain purposes is high-
ly suspect.137  Indeed, the test has added an entirely new element of 
confusion to suspicionless search jurisprudence.138  Assuming that the 
Court continues to examine suspicionless search cases so as to pro-
mote perceived desirable outcomes on a case-by-case basis, this con-
fusion is likely to persist.  Presumably, the primary purpose test also 
serves as a limit on the Court by restricting the spectrum of permissi-
ble purposes.  As with purported limits placed on law enforcement, 
however, any such restriction is superficial and prone to gamesman-
ship.139 
The primary purpose test fails to adequately restrict the use of 
suspicionless searches by law enforcement in two ways.  First, despite 
the protections of Edmond and Ferguson, there is a heightened risk of 
entirely pretextual claims in “special needs” cases that cannot be 
checked by the test.140  Second, even when law enforcement agencies 
possess suitable “non-law enforcement” justifications for a “specials 
needs” search, such as the interdiction of drunk drivers, they will like-
 
137 See generally Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond:  Steering Through Primary Purposes 
and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293 (2006) (discussing the application of 
Edmond in multi-purpose checkpoints). 
138 See Butterfoss, supra note 7, at 484–85 (examining the problems introduced by the test). 
139 See id. at 485. 
140 See id. at 484 (concluding that based on the Court’s track record with pretext inquiries, it 
is unlikely that post-Edmond cases would be subjected to careful scrutiny for a pre-textual 
purpose). 
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ly overuse such procedures.141  Whenever a law enforcement agency 
considers a suspicionless search, it cannot fail to consider the possibil-
ity that the otherwise impermissible procedure will reveal unrelated 
evidence of criminality.  Under such circumstances, law enforcement 
agencies will be encouraged to engage in these procedures more fre-
quently than in the (purely theoretical) situation where the promo-
tion of the policy-driven “special need” is the only goal.  Presuming 
that some optimal level of searches or seizures exists to promote the 
“special needs” interest at stake, the inherent weight of traditional law 
enforcement objectives in an agency’s decision to conduct a “special 
needs” search threatens to severely over-encourage such proce-
dures.142 
Consider, for example, the difficulty of determining the primary 
purpose of a license-and-registration checkpoint purportedly regulat-
ing the congestion caused by an open-air drug market.143  Despite the 
inherent difficulty of parsing apart the purpose at hand, in some situ-
ations well-defined “programmatic purposes” may be evident, assist-
ing the task.144  However, a number of concerns suggest that a “pro-
grammatic purposes” analysis will not provide an adequate solution.  
First, it is unlikely that the information required to make such an ex-
amination will often be present.  Second, even when such informa-
tion is apparently present, these ex post inquiries into law enforce-
ment intent are inherently difficult affairs, decreasing confidence in 
outcomes.  Finally, determinations of “programmatic purposes” are 
necessarily fact-intensive and time-consuming judicial efforts.145  Even 
 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that police officers 
had instituted the traffic safety stops at issue following complaints about speeding, as well 
as complaints about drug dealing, gun violence, robberies, and assaults); Holland, supra 
note 137, at 321 (discussing Davis and the difficulty of uncovering secondary purposes 
under the Edmond primary purpose test). 
142 Holland, supra note 137, at 322–23. 
143 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented with this 
situation in United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  Although decided 
before Edmond established the primary purpose test, the court nonetheless found that the 
“principal purpose” of the roadblock was to conduct license-and-registration checks and 
that “[w]hatever advantage was gained in drug enforcement was coincidental.”  Id. at 
1312–13; cf. United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that Edmond 
requires a more exhaustive analysis of potential “programmatic purposes” in the deter-
mination of a similar checkpoint’s primary purpose (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000)). 
144 See Holland, supra note 137, 346–47 (arguing that a discerning examination for “pro-
grammatic purposes” can effectively apply the basic Edmond test for highway checkpoints 
and protect against abuses). 
145 See id. at 347. 
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if such purposes could be found, both the judiciary and law enforce-
ment would be burdened by the search.  The guidelines that gener-
ally accompany roadway checkpoints would certainly assist in this 
task, but there is no requirement that the purposes of a procedure be 
clearly delineated.  Indeed, the prevalence of a “programmatic pur-
poses” inquiry might actually create a perverse incentive for law en-
forcement agencies to stop offering clear explanations of the pur-
poses behind checkpoints. 
Suspicionless searches are permitted with the understanding that 
they are unusually offensive to individual liberties.  Whether a valid 
non-law enforcement objective exists for a suspicionless procedure, 
the over-application of these procedures remains a significant con-
cern.  This concern is likely to only grow as Fourth Amendment ex-
ceptions are authorized under new circumstances and increasingly 
embraced by law enforcement.146  The primary purpose test cannot 
adequately separate desirable and undesirable search procedures on 
its own.  The standard is plagued by uncertainty and a significant po-
tential for abuse.  Realistically, however, we must accept that a com-
prehensive regime effectively rationalizing the disjointed facets of 
suspicionless search law is unlikely to develop organically from the 
primary purpose test. 
1.  An Insufficient Balancing Test 
While the current state of the law inadequately limits the purposes 
which can support suspicionless searches, conversely, it also unduly 
restricts the techniques permissible in achieving these purposes.  
Again, the absence of judicial guidance is largely responsible.  The 
enacting agency has incentives to select sub-optimal techniques in 
order to guarantee that the search procedure will be found reason-
able on review.  The problem is aggravated by certain considerations 
that the Court has emphasized in the balancing test.  Some of the 
elements that the Court has found to support the reasonableness of 
searches, in fact, undermine their efficacy without tangibly protecting 
individual rights. 
These problems have not affected all of the sub-probable cause 
search categories equally.  The techniques employed by law enforce-
ment officers have received much greater scrutiny than those em-
 
146 See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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ployed by other public officials.147  This makes sense for two reasons.  
First, to the extent that such scrutiny seeks to limit the discretion of 
officers during search and seizure procedures, it seems to be justified.  
Second, in situations where other public officials conduct the search 
or seizure, there is usually some additional link between the party 
searched and the body conducting the search.148  Arguably, the con-
nection between the parties makes the search more reasonable (or 
perhaps the lack of an external connection to the party searched 
makes law enforcement searches appear less reasonable). 
Based on these considerations, the additional scrutiny has been 
fairly easy to justify for the extant categories of suspicionless law en-
forcement searches, like those at checkpoints.  Most of the restric-
tions imposed on these procedures have been appropriately justified 
to limit discretion and selective enforcement.  However, the rise of 
new categories of desirable law enforcement searches lacking indi-
vidualized suspicion has emphasized the need for greater safeguards 
than in the checkpoint cases.149 
On its face, the reasonableness balancing test derived from Cama-
ra seems to account for situations where more invasive techniques are 
warranted by a greater public need.  As the extent of the need in-
creases, so will a court’s willingness to authorize more invasive tech-
niques.  However, the variable application of the balancing test also 
limits the ability of a governmental agency to predict which tech-
niques will be upheld post facto by the judiciary.  This uncertainty 
may result in the self-selection of sub-optimal methods by govern-
mental agencies. 
 
147 Indeed, at times it has appeared that the techniques chosen by non-law enforcement offi-
cials have received virtually no scrutiny whatsoever.  Consider, for example, Justice Sca-
lia’s opinion in Acton.  The opinion upheld a technique for the suspicionless drug testing 
of student athletes without examining whether a technique utilizing individualized suspi-
cion requirement would even be practical.  See supra Part III.C. 
148 Consider, for example, the connection between a student and a school (T.L.O.) or a pub-
lic employer and an employee (Skinner). 
149 Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (requiring sufficient safeguards to pre-
vent officer discretion and suggesting that there must be some affirmative indication that 
the search procedure in question would promote the public good), with New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (requiring no such restrictions).  While it is true that Prouse’s 
apparent requirement of provable utility was eschewed in Sitz, in many ways the policy jus-
tifications for sobriety checkpoints place them closer to “special needs” cases than tradi-
tional checkpoint cases.  As such, Sitz is better understood as a transitional case that fore-
shadowed policy-focused “special needs” to come.  See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990). 
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Compounding the problem, in evaluating the invasiveness of a 
technique, courts often emphasize the importance of factors which 
directly undermine its efficacy.  Accepting that certain suspicionless 
searches can be justified while still being offensive to privacy interests, 
a painful irony results.  In order to limit the invasiveness of searches, 
courts encourage methods that may undercut the purposes justifying 
the procedures in the first place.  Consequently, individuals may un-
necessarily endure suspicionless search techniques which inade-
quately promote the underlying goals.  The incremental invasion of 
rights produced by a more invasive technique must be weighed 
against the possibility that the primary invasion of rights occasioned 
by the initial search or seizure will be rendered ineffectual in the ab-
sence of the technique. 
2.  Black Sails on the Horizon:  Why the Situation Will Get Worse Sooner 
Rather than Later 
For reasons described above, these restrictions primarily hamper 
search procedures conducted by law enforcement officials.  Although 
such restrictions may be justifiable—or at least understandable—in 
the context of the cases that have reached the Court to date, new 
threats are challenging the desirability of such restrictions.  In par-
ticular, contemporary concerns over terrorist attacks and other catas-
trophic events are beginning to prompt new categories of suspi-
cionless searches and seizures in lower courts.150  The potential gravity 
of the harm implicated by these events sets them apart from prior 
cases.  It also distinguishes them from new categories of suspicionless 
searches that are currently being litigated in lower courts.151 
The expansion of suspicionless search categories and the growing 
disparity in the harms sought to be prevented by such searches pre-
sent serious challenges to the coherent and comprehensive regula-
tion of the varied categories as a whole.152  Assuming that increased 
 
150 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
151 Consider, for example, the application of the “special needs” doctrine and its corollaries 
to mandatory DNA sampling from arrestees.  See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA 
Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 489–98 (2001) (examining differing 
opinions in lower courts as to whether DNA sampling may be permissible under the “spe-
cial needs” or related doctrines). 
152 For example, rising concerns over terrorism have prompted proposals to establish special 
approaches for terrorism-related searches.  See, e.g., Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless 
Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11:  Searching for Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 210 (2007) 
(recommending reviews of proposed terrorism-related checkpoints by the Department of 
Homeland Security as a check against unfettered law enforcement discretion). 
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deference to law enforcement is justified under certain circum-
stances, an additional problem follows:  if increasingly invasive tech-
niques are permitted, there will be a correspondingly heightened 
concern over potential abuses. 
V.  FACING THE FACTS:  THE ADVANTAGES OF APPLYING THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT TO SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The rise of the contemporary suspicionless search and seizure re-
gime threatens to imprint a great irony into the Fourth Amendment:  
the less that you are suspected of committing a crime, the more likely 
it is that you can be searched without a warrant.  This section pro-
poses to dismantle that irony and to significantly mend suspicionless 
search and seizure doctrine in the process. 
With limited exceptions,153 the Court has found that the warrant 
requirement does not extend into the realm of sub-probable cause.  
One proffered justification for this predicament is that the purposes 
of the warrant requirement are not furthered in situations where in-
dividualized suspicion is lacking.154  Justice Scalia has gone even far-
ther by concluding for the majority in Griffin that the warrant proce-
dure would be unconstitutional in its application under such 
circumstances.155  This section argues that neither of these conclu-
sions holds true.  First, the constitutionality of area warrants lacking 
individualized suspicion will be addressed.  Next, the utility of area 
warrants in the context of suspicionless searches will be examined. 
A.  The Constitutionality of Area Search Warrants 
1. The 1970s and Early Support for Area Searches 
There are two potential constitutional obstacles to applying the 
Warrant Clause to suspicionless searches.  The first potential obstacle 
is met at the start of the Warrant Clause:  “and no Warrants shall is-
 
153 The primary exception is for administrative searches.  The warrant requirement may still 
apply in such cases, even though there is a reduced standard for probable cause.  See Ca-
mara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 532–33 (1967) (requiring a warrant prior to a 
housing inspector’s search of a building even under a relaxed standard for probable 
cause). 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564–65 (1976) (refusing to apply 
the warrant requirement to a checkpoint search as the purposes of the warrant require-
ment would not be served). 
155 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1987). 
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sue, but upon probable cause.”156  A literal reading of the Warrant 
Clause, then, apparently requires that any and all warrants be sup-
ported by probable cause.157  The second potential obstacle appears 
later in the Warrant Clause in the so-called particularity requirement, 
which requires that a warrant describe “the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”158  A close textual reading of the 
particularity requirement arguably restricts the application of war-
rants to those searches where a threshold of particularity can be met 
with respect to the persons, or items, sought.  Area warrants would 
likely not be able to individually identify the persons to be searched 
or seized.159  Further, even if an area warrant could identify a class of 
individuals to be targeted, the identification of a group as a search 
target would still arguably be insufficient. 
However, the Court has not interpreted the Warrant Clause liter-
ally as suggested above.  First, Camara explicitly rejected the require-
ment of probable cause for administrative area warrants.160  Rather 
than applying the traditional understanding of probable cause to 
such warrants, the Court evaluated the housing inspection program 
before it by looking purely for reasonableness.161  Within this test, the 
governmental interest was held to be the determinative factor:  “If a 
valid public interest justified the intrusion contemplated, then there 
is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.”162  Ca-
 
156 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
157 See, for example, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Griffin, which explained: 
While it is possible to say that Fourth Amendment reasonableness demands prob-
able cause without a judicial warrant, the reverse runs up against the constitutional 
provision that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”  The Constitu-
tion prescribes, in other words, that where the matter is of such a nature as to re-
quire a judicial warrant, it is also of the nature as to require probable cause. 
  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 (citation omitted). 
158 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
159 This, however, is not necessarily true.  It may often be the case that the individual mem-
bers of a class targeted by a suspicionless search or seizure are fully identifiable before-
hand.  In the context of administrative inspections this has generally proven true.  See, 
e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (authorizing 
warranted area-inspections of buildings).  Virtually all of the “special needs” searches and 
seizures to reach the Court have similarly provided a targeted class of individuals identifi-
able beforehand.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
(finding railroad employees involved in a rail accident); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (providing for certain treasury employees); Griffin, 483 
U.S. 868 (discussing probationers); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying 
to students). 
160 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–35. 
161 Id. at 536–37. 
162 Id. at 539. 
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mara’s promulgation of a reasonableness analysis for determinations 
of probable cause represented a tremendous paradigm shift in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  That the same decision applied 
this analysis within the context of a warranted search supports the 
conclusion that the Camara Court did not intend to create a thresh-
old below which a warrant could not be issued.  Rather, the decision 
suggests that the new reasonableness analysis for probable cause 
should inform the warrant requirement as well. 
Subsequent cases involving administrative searches support this 
conclusion.  Consider, for example, the “closely-regulated” business 
exception to the Fourth Amendment.  As in Camara, administrative 
searches of “closely-regulated” businesses are subject to a reduced 
standard for probable cause that does not require individualized sus-
picion.163  In such cases, the Court has developed an exception to the 
warrant requirement to allow for warrantless searches where:  (1) a 
substantial governmental interest existed; (2) the warrantless inspec-
tions were necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the 
search contained a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant.164 
Yet, where the Supreme Court has required a warrant for an ad-
ministrative search, it has made clear that it will not apply a rigorous 
understanding of the particularity requirement.  Consider Marshall v. 
Barlow’s Inc.,165 in which the Court upheld the warrant requirement 
for work-place inspections under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970.166  Unlike the typical warrant for a search of a location, a 
warrant for an administrative search lacking the traditional level of 
probable cause generally cannot provide much detail beyond the ad-
dress that is to be searched.  Indeed, such a search is usually premised 
on the fact that the government does not know exactly what it is look-
ing for.167  The same is true for suspicionless searches.  For such a 
warrant, the government will likely be able to provide an address, a 
stated purpose, and general parameters for a search.  This should be 
 
163 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–702 (1987) (applying a reduced standard 
of probable cause for the administrative inspection of a vehicle dismantling business); 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (applying the lower standard to inspections 
of mines). 
164 Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03. 
165 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
166 Id. at 325. 
167 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 (noting that the inspection at issue was aimed at ensuring city-
wide compliance and was not based on evidence of specific problems at the address in 
question). 
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sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement under the unique 
circumstances of these searches.  Moreover, even if only a modicum 
of particularity could be specified in a suspicionless search warrant, 
this modest amount of particularity must be contrasted against the 
alternative.  In the absence of a warrant, suspicionless searches have 
no particularity requirement whatsoever. 
Still, in the context of suspicionless searches, the Supreme Court 
has generally proven divided on the constitutionality of area searches, 
although it has never addressed the issue in any depth.  Justice Powell 
was perhaps the most vociferous supporter of their constitutionality.  
Early in the Court’s suspicionless search jurisprudence, he concluded 
that “the determination of whether a warrant should be issued for an 
area search involves a balancing of the legitimate interests of law en-
forcement with protected Fourth Amendment rights.”168  Justice Pow-
ell would have analyzed the necessity for warrants in situations lack-
ing individualized suspicion, as in Almeida-Sanchez, by examining the 
standard Fourth Amendment exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
namely exigency.169  Beyond the classic exceptions, Justice Powell’s 
concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez also analyzed the feasibility of the 
warrant requirement under the particular circumstances of the 
case.170  Such an analysis was fully compatible with his focus on rea-
sonableness.  Indeed, it seemed to parallel the consideration of less 
invasive alternative means in mainstream Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. 
Until Justice Scalia’s opinion in Griffin, the Court appeared to be 
divided as to the constitutionality of area warrants.  However, in at 
least one of the early suspicionless search cases—Almeida-Sanchez—a 
majority of the Court appeared to accept their constitutionality.171  
 
168 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 284 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). 
169 Id. at 281–82. 
170 Id. at 282–83. 
171 Id. at 270 n.3 (“The Justices who join this opinion are divided upon the question of the 
constitutionality of area search warrants such as described in Mr. Justice Powell’s concur-
ring opinion.”).  Although the split within the Almeida-Sanchez majority on the issue is un-
certain, both Justice Powell’s concurrence and Justice White’s dissent (with which three 
additional justices joined) accepted the constitutionality of such area warrants.  See id. at 
279–81 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the warrant requirement is fully applicable 
to searches lacking probable cause); id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting) (“I agree with Mr. 
Justice Powell that such a warrant so issued would satisfy the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).  
On this basis, it is more likely than not that, at the time, a majority of the Court did not 
view probable cause as a prerequisite for a warrant.  As to the ongoing nature of the di-
vide, the Court appeared to be unwilling to settle the issue through the checkpoint cases, 
even when the issue was implicated in lower courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-
 
  
1046 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:4 
 
Since then, the Court appears to have gone out of its way to avoid 
having to rule on the issue.  When the issue finally reappeared in 
T.L.O., the majority simply held that a warrant would be impractical 
under the circumstances, failing to note any potential constitutional 
issues.172  Focusing on the practical concerns of the setting, the Court 
analogized to its Camara opinion.173  By relying on the unsuitability of 
a warrant to the school environment, the majority appeared to pre-
sume that a warrant based on less than probable cause could be con-
stitutional under the circumstances.  Further, the examination closely 
paralleled Justice Powell’s concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez, emphasiz-
ing the reasonableness of the search under the practical circum-
stances.174 
In sum, the Court’s prior jurisprudence hints that area warrants 
are, in fact, constitutionally permissible.  The continuing Fourth 
Amendment focus on reasonableness in the wake of Camara only fur-
ther suggests this.  Indeed, the reasonableness of such searches is on-
ly more evident when the theoretical underpinnings of the alterna-
tive understanding are scrutinized. 
2. The Fallacy of the (Apparently) Prevailing Understanding 
While a strict textual analysis may support Justice Scalia’s interpre-
tation of the invalidity of area searches, it cannot explain the permis-
sibility of such searches in other circumstances.175  More egregiously, 
this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment creates a distressing pa-
radox.  On the one hand, suspicionless searches and seizures bear an 
uncomfortable resemblance to the general warrants that so vexed the 
Framers, albeit absent the warrant procedure.176  In at least one situa-
tion, the Court has even authorized suspicionless searches of homes, 
 
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 n.15 (1976) (determining that since no warrant was needed, the 
issue need not be addressed even though it had been the principle issue before the Ninth 
Circuit below). 
172 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,  340 (1985). 
173 Id.; see also id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring) (presuming the constitutionality of war-
rants in “special needs” cases where probable cause is absent). 
174 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 283 (Powell, J., concurring). 
175 See supra Part III.A. 
176 See Davies, supra note 19, at 576.  Although Davies recounts that the Framers’ primary 
concern was with searches of homes under general warrants, he explains that the Fram-
ers’ “larger purpose” was “to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers.”  Id. 
at 556.  But see Amar, supra note 19, at 771 (arguing that the Framers were more con-
cerned with judicial abuses than with warrantless intrusions by government agents). 
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the very intrusion with which the Framers were most concerned.177  In 
contrast, the warrant requirement, which could serve as a potential 
restraint on abuses of official discretion, has almost never been ap-
plied in the suspicionless search context.178  Thus, paradoxically, while 
suspicionless searches and seizures resemble general warrants, they 
are not constrained by the requirement of actually obtaining a war-
rant.  They are, in a sense, just general searches and general seizures 
lacking any substantive oversight. 
Regardless of the type of searches that the Framers were most 
concerned with, the warrant requirement can potentially serve to lim-
it official discretion and define permissible governmental activity.179  
Ironically, under Justice Scalia’s view of the Fourth Amendment, the 
less one is suspected of wrongdoing by the government, the more 
likely it is that the government will avoid judicial oversight for search-
ing that person.180  This interpretation enfeebles the Warrant Clause 
to the point of nullity.  Under any understanding of Fourth Amend-
ment history, this cannot represent the Framers’ intent.  The real 
question then is what, if any, compelling reasons exist not to unify 
suspicionless search doctrine with the rest of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. 
B.  Potential Benefits of Applying the Warrant Requirement to Suspicionless 
Searches 
The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear exception to the 
warrant requirement for suspicionless searches and seizures.  Al-
though Justice Scalia has opined a view suggesting their unconstitu-
tionality, the Court’s prevailing approach in these cases has been to 
bypass the warrant requirement through an unparalleled solicitude 
 
177 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); see also Davies, supra note 19, at 642–49 
(explaining the unique concern in the colonies over intrusions into homes). 
178 The sole exception exists in the administrative search context where searches of closely 
regulated industries may still require warrants even though no individualized suspicion 
exists.  See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323–24 (1978). 
179 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment’s “protection consists in requiring that . . . inferences be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). 
180 This predicament bears a certain resemblance to the point that Justice Stewart made of 
closely regulated industries in Donovan, when he criticized the Court’s reasoning for sug-
gesting that “the scope of the Fourth Amendment diminishes as the power of governmen-
tal regulation increases.”  Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 612 (1981) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). 
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with reasonableness.  Time and time again, the Court has found that 
the maintenance of the warrant requirement under the specific cir-
cumstances in suspicionless search cases would prove unworkable.181  
Alternatively, the Court has at times suggested that a warrant proce-
dure would prove superfluous in the case before it.182  Presuming that 
area search warrants on less than probable cause can be constitu-
tional, neither of these arguments can explain why the warrant re-
quirement has never been applied in any of the contexts examined 
except for administrative searches. 
More importantly, these arguments cannot account for persuasive 
justifications encouraging the application of area warrants under 
more expansive circumstances.  The traditional benefits of the war-
rant requirement are fully applicable to searches on less than prob-
able cause.  However, where law enforcement lacks the traditional 
requirement of probable cause, the application of a warrant require-
ment has unique benefits.  First, the warrant procedure requires (or 
could require) law enforcement to clearly delineate the goals of a 
search and the methods to be used in furtherance of those goals.  
Second, to the extent that the warrant procedure serves as an obsta-
cle to law enforcement, it may encourage law enforcement agencies 
to self-prioritize the most important (or effective) of these privacy-
infringing searches.  Third, by reducing ex ante uncertainty, a war-
rant procedure may actually encourage more effective methods to be 
used during these searches. 
Such steps are all the more important because the primary pur-
pose test likely over-encourages the use of suspicionless searches.  
Once a valid special need is identified, the enforcing governmental 
agency has a powerful alternative reason to conduct a suspicionless 
search no matter the importance of the need.  The desire to detect, 
or obtain evidence of, criminality unrelated to the “special need” is 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate from a valid interest in pro-
moting the “special need” itself.  Although the Supreme Court has 
attempted to limit the use of suspicionless search doctrine in support 
of pre-textual stops,183 such limits fail to ensure that governmental 
 
181 See supra Part V.A. 
182 See id. 
183 The Supreme Court has, for example, refused to allow random roving car stops as these 
are perceived to grant too much discretion to individual officers and increase the risk of 
abuse.  See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558–59 (1976) (distinguishing 
routine checkpoint stops from random roving-patrol stops). 
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agencies are not over-enforcing these privacy-infringing procedures 
for general crime prevention purposes. 
The warrant requirement could limit such over-enforcement, 
however.  During the warrant application process, an over-enforcing 
agency would have to provide the underlying purpose that supported 
the search, opening the door to at least some judicial scrutiny.  
Moreover, the process would likely encourage closer involvement by 
District Attorney offices and state Attorney General offices with local 
law enforcement agencies.  In addition to the potential benefits of 
judicial oversight, such involvement would hopefully encourage 
stronger internal controls and oversight within state governments.  
Indeed, if a disingenuous purpose were at work, the reporting re-
quirement would potentially open a state actor to public scrutiny as 
well (although not necessarily immediately).  This risk, along with the 
additional time and resources required, would discourage suspi-
cionless search applications that were not actually urgent (i.e. those 
that lacked a sufficiently compelling purpose in the first place). 
At the same time, when circumstances so demand, the warrant 
process might actually allow for more invasive techniques than would 
otherwise be imposed.  By detailing exactly what procedures are per-
missible, warrants could eliminate any uncertainty in law enforce-
ment’s selection of procedures.184  In essence, law enforcement offi-
cers would know exactly how far they could reach in promoting the 
search’s purpose.  Thus, when in doubt, law enforcement agencies 
would not have to worry about utilizing less effective methods just to 
ensure that the search would later be upheld by a court. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Suspicionless search and seizure doctrine may represent an inco-
herent mess, but it is nevertheless understandable.  The confusion of 
tangent Fourth Amendment fields has been compounded in this par-
ticular area by the great variability of purposes and methods pre-
sented in suspicionless search cases.  Solutions have remained elusive.  
While doctrinal changes are undoubtedly necessary, pragmatically, 
the most important step toward a viable suspicionless search regime 
lies with procedural changes.  Regardless of the shifting doctrinal 
borders of suspicionless search jurisprudence, a more effective pro-
 
184 See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding random suspi-
cionless subway searches in part because the policy protected privacy interests by allowing 
passengers the option of simply leaving the station rather than submitting to a search). 
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cedural framework promises to elucidate the analysis and to promote 
better results in individual cases. 
This Comment proposes that a return to a conventional Fourth 
Amendment principle in the guise of the warrant requirement will at 
least improve the situation.  A further implication is that area war-
rants are both constitutional and desirable in effecting this result.  As 
new demands on law enforcement develop in the Twenty-first Cen-
tury, the existing relationship between public-need and private-liberty 
will likely be further challenged.  The ultimate conclusion of this 
Comment is that the promulgation of area warrants to suspicionless 
searches will clarify the balancing of interests, promoting net-
desirable searches and seizures while limiting net-undesirable ones.  
At the very least, the preceding discussion suggests that the time has 
come to consider a multi-faceted approach to demystifying suspi-
cionless search doctrine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
